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The purpose of this paper is to test a mediated moderation model of the joint influence of abusive supervision, high-performance work systems (HPWSs) and organizational commitment and intention to leave on employee silence.

Data were collected from 456 employees and 78 human resource managers in 78 Chinese organizations.

The results revealed that abusive supervision led to subordinate silence, and HPWSs intensified this effect. In addition, such moderating effect of HPWSs was accounted for by employees’ organizational commitment and intention to leave.

To reduce the occurrence of employee silence, organizations should not only monitor and restrain abusive supervisory actions, but also be aware of subordinates’ work attitudes driven by organizational HPWSs.

This is the first study which demonstrates that HPWSs can foster employees’ organizational commitment and hinder their intention to leave and consequently strengthen the relation between abusive supervision and employee silence.

This study aims to test the experiential advantage argument from both the hedonic and eudaimonic well-being perspectives and seeks to explore the mediating roles of a sense of meaning, as well as the moderating effects of consumers’ motivational autonomy, in a novel context – China.

Study 1 (n = 203) used a between-subject experiment where participants role-played an imaginary purchase with experiential versus material focus; Study 2 (n = 290) used a recall method where participants were asked to recall their past experiential purchase or material purchase that cost more than RMB500 (about US$70); Study 3 (n = 185) used a between-subject experiment where participants were assigned to one of the four scenarios (two types of purchases (experiential vs material) × 2 levels of motivational autonomy (high vs low).

The authors find that the experiential advantage argument holds true for eudaimonic well-being as well as hedonic well-being in three studies with Chinese consumers. In addition, the authors find that a sense of meaning serves as an additional mediator for the experiential advantage argument. Further, the authors find that the level of motivational autonomy positively moderates the effect size of experiential advantages and the mediating roles of a sense of meaning.

The authors only address the two ends of the experiential–material purchase continuum. Whether the discovered mediation roles of a sense of meaning and the moderation roles of motivational autonomy hold for hybrid experiential products remain unknown.

The authors enriched the experiential advantage literature through exploring the mediation roles of a sense of meaning and the moderating effects of motivational autonomy in the experiential advantage model.

This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different government subsidy policies.

The authors establish a model consisting of a government, a set of heterogeneous consumers and a manufacturer. Three government subsidy policies are investigated without government subsidy (NS), government subsidy to consumer (CS) and government subsidy to the manufacturer (MS).

The results show that the government subsidy can increase both the green product’s demand and the manufacturer’s profit. The subsidy level and government’s utility under the CS policy are equal to those under the MS policy. Furthermore, if the government’s subsidy level is exogenous, there exists a Pareto improvement region when social welfare for unit greenness level is high. That is, if the government’s subsidy level under the CS policy is higher than that under the MS policy, both government and manufacturer prefer the CS policy; otherwise, they prefer the MS policy.

This paper considers the market where there is a monopoly green manufacturer and a government that only provides subsidy policy. In fact, competition from traditional manufacturers and carbon taxes are also worth exploring in future research.

This study provides some suggestions for government subsidy and provides guidance for the manufacturer’s pricing decisions under different government subsidy policies.

This paper is the first to compare government subsidy to consumer with a government subsidy to the manufacturer and investigate the pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously by considering an endogenous subsidy level of government.

Prior studies find that US firms with managerial incentives may manipulate the earnings gap to obscure higher performing segments to competitors or to hide underperforming segments from external monitors. The purpose of this study is to complement extant research by examining the association between managerial incentives and segment earnings reporting of cross-listed firms in the USA and the impact of country-level characteristics on this association.

The dependent variable is the earnings gap between firm-level earnings and sum of segment-level earnings. Managerial incentives are proxied by proprietary cost and agency cost. Proprietary cost is measured by the Herfindahl index. Agency cost is measured by inefficient resource transfer activities across segments. Foreign firms in this study are companies listed on major US Stock Exchanges with headquarters outside the USA. Comparable US firms are selected using the Propensity Score Matching procedure as a control group.

The authors find that 1) proprietary cost motive is not the determinant of earnings gap reporting for cross-listed firms; 2) cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs are more likely to manipulate segment earnings reporting than US firms; and 3) among cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs, firms in weak rule of law countries demonstrate more manipulation in segment earnings than firms in strong rule of law countries.

Extant research with regard to segment reporting exclusively focuses on US firms, and little is known about the practice of segment reporting by cross-listed firms originating from different legal regimes. This study fills the gap in the literature by comparing cross-listed firms to US firms in the reporting of segment earnings. The results of this study have implications for regulators and investors who are interested in evaluating the extent of cross-listed firms’ financial reporting quality.

The purpose of this paper is to address whether gender diversity on compensation committees ensures objective determination of CEOs’ compensation.

The authors use a sample of companies listed in China from 2006 to 2015. The authors use pooled ordinary least square regression as the baseline methodology, and two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching to control for endogeneity.

The authors find evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees limit CEOs’ total cash compensation and strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance, but only independent female directors have a significant impact, indicating that the monitoring effect outweighs the executive effect. Moreover, compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors have more impact on CEOs’ total pay and the link between CEO pay and firm performance than do committees with a single female director. Finally, gender-diverse compensation committees are more effective in setting CEOs’ compensation in state-controlled firms, where agency issues are more severe.

Female directors can improve firm-level governance by monitoring management actions, such as setting CEOs’ compensation. The study contributes to the debate on gender diversity in the boardroom, finding a positive economic effect. The study sheds light on China’s diversity practices at the director level and provides empirical guidance to China’s regulatory bodies.

The authors extend earlier studies by providing the first empirical evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance; that independent female directors are more effective in the monitoring role than executive female directors; that compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors are more effective in setting CEOs’ pay than are committees with a single female director; and that the influence of gender-diverse compensation committees on CEOs’ pay varies by type of ownership.